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Since 2003, the United States has been actively pursuing the  creation of a 
Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) as part of its post-9/11 broader strategy 
to use bilateral trade agreements and regional reform as weapons against global 
terrorism. While the strategy has had some early successes – notably with the 
completion installation of lesser bilateral trade and investment protection treaties 
with a number of Middle East countries, and  free trade agreements (FTAs) with 
Jordan, Bahrain and Oman – it now threatens  to stall on a number of counts. 
FTA negotiations between the United States and the UAE, which commenced at 
the same time as the Oman negotiations have now ground to a halt.  Qatar and 
Kuwait, which had shown a willingness to commence discussions soon after the 
completion of the Oman FTA, have since indicated that they now are in no hurry 
to enter into FTAs.Domestically, the MEFTA strategy has encountered further 
problems as the balance of power in Congress shifts from the Republicans to the 
Democrats.  The growing opposition in Congress to the President’s Middle East 
policies has caused the non-renewal of the Administration’s Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA), which provided the framework for ‘fast-track’ Congressional 
approval process for the Administration’s bilateral trade agreements. The TPA 
expired on 1 July 2007, and even at this late stage there is uncertainty as to 
whether Congress will belatedly renew it at least until the end of the President’s 
final term. As the Bush Presidency enters the winter of its final term, the future of 
the MEFTA strategy and the consequent bilateral trade agreements in the Middle 
East are experiencing the stagnation that can mark the administration of an 
outgoing president.   
 
 
Field Of Research: Economics/International Trade/Middle East 
 
 
1. Background 
 
As part of its Middle East Peace Initiative in the post-9/11 global war against 
terrorism, the Bush Administration has placed economic and political reform in 
the Middle East at the top of its international agenda. In March 2003, the US 
President announced the launch of the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) 
strategy, by which the United States planned to establish by 2013 a US-
sponsored free trade area encompassing the greater Middle East and the 
Maghreb regions.  The MEFTA strategy includes 20 countries - 16 in the Middle 
East (Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Gaza and the West Bank, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE and Yemen) and 
four in North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia).  However, this article 
focuses only upon the Middle East region. 
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The MEFTA strategy is a key part of the United States’ broader initiative to 
achieve that reform in order to complement and extend its already significant 
geopolitical, economic and military involvement in the region (Katzman, 2005).  
Accordingly, US trade and investment relations with the countries of the Middle 
East have considerable potential importance and urgency in terms of both US 
political and economic interests. A crucial tool in the execution of the MEFTA 
strategy has been the US Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), enacted as part of 
the Trade Act (2002).  The TPA provides a framework for a streamlined or “fast-
track” mechanism for Congressional approval of trade agreements provided that 
their terms are within Congressional pre-approved parameters.  The President 
has used the TPA to initiate his global, regional and bilateral trade strategies, 
including agreements which are part of the MEFTA initiative.   
 
While the strategy has had some early successes – notably with the completion 
of lesser bilateral trade and investment protection treaties with a number of 
Middle East countries, and free trade agreements (FTAs) with Jordan, Bahrain 
and Oman – it now threatens to stall on a number of counts.  FTA negotiations 
between the United States and the UAE, which commenced at the same time as 
those with Oman, have now ground to a halt.  Qatar and Kuwait, which had both 
shown willingness to commence discussions soon after completion of the Oman 
FTA, have since indicated that they now are in no hurry to enter into their own 
FTAs. 
 
2. The President’s Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) 
 
The TPA sets detailed notice and consultation requirements for the Bush 
Administration to follow in respect of Congress and the US private sector, before 
and during its trade agreement negotiations.  More importantly, if the 
Administration has followed TPA notice and consultation procedures, Congress is 
required to approve or reject a concluded agreement in its entirety within a set 
period – without opportunity to remove, add or require amendment. Under the 
TPA procedures, the Administration must give Congress three months notice that 
it has completed a trade agreement.  Since the current TPA expired on 30 June 
2007, this meant in effect that any completed trade agreement that had not been 
notified to Congress by 31 March 2007 could not be dealt with under the TPA, 
and would therefore be subject to full clause by clause scrutiny in both houses of 
Congress, and possible rejection. The TPA came into force in August 2002, after 
earlier unsuccessful attempts by the Clinton Administration to renew fast-track 
legislation which had lapsed in 1994.  The TPA was renewed in November 2005 
for a further two year term, almost four months after its scheduled expiry date, 
but only after a vigorous debate and close in Congress.  In late March 2007, the 
President formally requested Congress to renew the TPA, at least to the end of 
his term of office.  To date, with less than 12 months of his term of office to run, 
Congress has declined to renew Presidential authority under the TPA. 
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In recent years, the passage of the Bush Administration’s negotiated trade 
agreements through Congress has experienced an increasing degree of critical 
scrutiny and an ever-growing reluctance on the part of members of both houses 
to accept the agreements without demurral.  The pre 9/11 Jordan FTA of 2001 
sailed through both houses of the Congress “on the voices – in essence, 
unanimously.  The Bahrain FTA of 2004 passed through the House of 
Representatives with a substantial majority and through the Senate on the 
voices.  By the time the Oman FTA came before Congress in 2006, the critical 
and dissentious environment had grown considerably, to the extent that the FTA 
was passed through the House of Representatives by the smallest of margins – 
221 votes to 205 (although it passed through the Senate with a comfortable 
majority).  
 
But the Democrat’s return to power in the House of Representatives raises even 
greater concerns for the Bush Administration that its ongoing capacity to continue 
to dismantle global trade barriers through its use of the TPA, is in real trouble.  
With the Presidential authority under the TPA having already expired and with 
clear indication that the Democrat-controlled Congress will not agree to a further 
extension, there raises the spectre of a stagnation in the President’s trade 
agenda – or as suggested by Daniel Griswold of the US’ Cato Institute (Griswold, 
2006) – “two years of stalemate in US trade policy” Trade policy has been 
identified by the Democrats as an area which requires sweeping changes.  Not 
only is there concern over access rights by foreign business to key and sensitive 
areas of US business and industry – such as US ports – there is significant push 
for incorporation of labour market reforms and minimum labour standards into 
trade agreements.  Hence there currently exists a stand-off between the Bush 
Administration and Congress, posing a critical test of the two sides' ability to find 
common ground on trade.  The Democrats insist that tough new rules on 
compliance with international conventions on workers rights must be incorporated 
into pending trade agreements with Colombia, Peru and Panama if these 
agreements are to have any chance of being approved.  The Bush Administration 
proposal in response would only require countries to pass laws that were either 
"equivalent" to US federal labour law or complied with International Labour 
Organisation conventions. Failure of the Bush Administration to accede to the 
Democrats’ requirements in respect of these particular agreements has not only 
jeopardised their approval, but reinforced Congress’ determination not to extend 
the TPA.     
 
3. The US bilateral trade strategy in the Middle East  
 
Since the MEFTA launch, the Bush Administration through its Office of the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) has accelerated its negotiations on bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) and trade and investment framework agreements 
(TIFAs) - major steps toward generating FTA talks – with countries in the region. 
The United States has completed BIT and TIFA treaties with most of the Middle 
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East countries, and signed FTAs with Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman.  However, 
FTA negotiations with the UAE and Qatar have both badly stalled, with little 
expectation of agreement emerging within the remaining term of the present US 
Administration.   
 
The United States has insisted on individual agreements with each Middle East 
state, repeatedly declining to negotiate collectively with the states as regional or 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) blocs (namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE).  It justifies this state-by-state approach on the 
grounds that it recognises the differing levels of state development across the 
region and thereby allows a step-by-step approach tailored to individual states’ 
particular needs (Zoellick, 2004).  However, this argument is difficult to sustain in 
view of the fact that the US bilateral agreements and FTAs are all based on 
model agreements whose objective is to achieve standardisation with minimal 
deviation. Change is permitted to the extent that it constitutes refinement of the 
model. Hence some provisions of the Oman FTA, such as the intellectual 
property chapter, are almost identical with those of the Bahrain FTA, which in 
turned are closely aligned with those of the Jordanian, Moroccan, and even the 
Australian, agreements.  Similarly, the TIFAs of all Middle East states are 
identical in substance and virtually identical in text.  The “step-by-step” approach 
enables the United States to implement a divide and conquer strategy, and 
prevent the creation of powerful opposition alliances of the kind that it has 
encountered in the multilateral forum of the WTO (Choudry, 2004).  It also allows 
the United States to maximise its immense political and economic bargaining 
power to extract the most favourable trading terms from its agreement partners – 
a tactic being used in its MEFTA implementation strategy.   
 
U.S. – Middle East Free Trade Efforts (as at July 2007) 
   
Country FTA TIFA BIT 
Bahrain completed 2004/ratified 2006  2002 1999 
Israel 1985 √ √ 
Iraq  - 2005  - 
Iran  - -   - 
Jordan 2001 - 1997 
Kuwait informal discussions ceased 2004  - 
Lebanon  - 2006  - 
Oman completed 2004/ ratified 2006 2004  - 
Qatar  negotiations stalled 2004 - 
Saudi Arabia -  2003  - 
Syria  -  -  - 
UAE negotiations stalled 2003  - 
Yemen - 2004  - 
 
Source:  Office of the USTR, as updated by the author 
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4.  The FTA Negotiations 
 
The US – Jordan FTA 
 
The Jordan FTA, signed in October 2002, was the first such agreement with an 
Arab state and was considered a template for future agreements.  The treaty was 
held up for some years over dispute in the United States over the nature of labor 
and environmental provisions to be included in the FTA; the treaty, originally 
negotiated by the Clinton Administration, merely required Jordan to enforce its 
own labor and environmental laws, or to bring them into compliance with 
international agreements to which Jordan had already acceded. Nevertheless, 
the Jordan FTA passed through both houses of Congress by unanimous consent.    
 
The US – Bahrain FTA  
 
The Bahrain FTA, signed on 29 May 2004, was greeted with general positive 
enthusiasm on both sides.  It was concluded in less than five months of 
negotiations, a remarkably short period of time in the context of free trade 
agreement negotiations. The Bahraini Prime Minister, Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman 
Al Khalifa, described the Agreement as “a reflection of the respect and 
appreciation the Kingdom had gained as a consequence of its constant 
development, which in turn has boosted the safety and success of the country’s 
political, economic and social policies.” (Bahrain Tribune, 2004). With somewhat 
different emphasis, USTR Robert Zoellick declared that the FTA “is a high 
quality, comprehensive agreement that will provide American workers, 
consumers and businesses unprecedented economic opportunity in Bahrain…” 
(USTR, 2004d)  
 
The Bahrain FTA derives much from its Jordan predecessor, but greatly extends 
and enhances many of the latter’s characteristics and provisions.  Being the first 
post-MEFTA FTA with a Middle East state, it is therefore the most crucial.  The 
standards achieved and concessions gained in this agreement established a 
precedent and new enhanced benchmarks for future agreements in the Middle 
East region, just as the Morocco FTA did in North Africa. The fact that the 
Bahrain FTA negotiations were concluded in less than five months is clear 
indication of both US determination to adopt an aggressive bargaining stance 
and Bahraini keenness to reach an agreement.  The rapid progression and 
conclusion of negotiations took even the USTR by surprise (USTR, 2004d).   
However, the Bahrain FTA generated protest amongst the GCC member states.  
Saudi Arabia in particular raised strong objection on the grounds that it violated 
the basic tenets of the GCC Unified Economic Agreement of 2001, which 
stipulates that “no member state may grant to a non-member state any 
preferential treatment exceeding that granted herein to member states, nor 
conclude any agreement that violates provisions of this agreement.” (Gulf 
Cooperation Council, 2001).  
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The US-Oman FTA 
 
In November 2004, the USTR notified Congress that it intended to negotiate with 
Oman and the UAE on their respective FTAs, from 2005.   It advised (USTR, 
2005a) that:  
 
“These FTAs will build on those that we already have with Jordan and 
Morocco, as well as the FTA that we have recently signed with Bahrain … 
these FTAs [with Oman and the UAE] will directly benefit the United States … 
will generate job opportunities for US companies, farmers and ranchers, help 
create jobs in the United States, and help American consumers save money 
while offering them more consumer choices.”   
 
Because of the negative reaction amongst some GCC states to the Bahrain FTA, 
some reluctance initially existed in Oman and the UAE about entering into an 
agreement as willingly as did Bahrain.  In December 2004, the Omani Minister for 
Economy was reported in the local press as saying that it was too soon to say 
whether it would seek an FTA with the United States, after these GCC 
differences emerged (Arab News, 2004a). The Oman FTA was finalized in 
October 2005, after seven months of negotiation.  The Omani Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, Maqbool bin Ali Sultan, described the agreement as “a 
balanced and mutually advantageous agreement”, but also noted that the 
agreement “will consolidate, slowly define and further strengthen the existing 
economic and trade relations between our two countries” (Financial Times (UK), 
2005).  His use of the qualifier “slowly” in respect of redefining the relationship 
between the two countries expresses, it is suggested, an Omani note of caution 
and reservation about the FTA and its overall benefits.   
 
However, notwithstanding the existence of, and the Bush Administration’s 
compliance with, TPA requirements, the Oman FTA suffered a difficult passage 
through Congress.  Experiencing the after-effects of the controversy over the 
Dubai Ports World controversy (see below), the FTA was vigorously debated in 
both houses of Congress.  Concern was expressed that the agreement’s 
liberalization of mutual investment provisions raised the spectre of Omani control 
of a US port, which many members of Congress perceived as a serious potential 
threat to US domestic security. The agreement was eventually passed by the 
smallest of margins in the House of Representatives - 221 votes to 205 against - 
and by 60 to 34 votes in the Senate.  This vote was in stark contrast to the 
Bahrain FTA and Morocco FTAs which sailed through both houses with very 
large majorities. The troubled passage of the Oman FTA was a direct 
consequence of the Dubai Ports World furore.  Its passage clearly demonstrates 
that any future FTA – including those anticipated with the UAE and Qatar – would 
have little or no chance of passing through Congress without major changes to 
ensure higher safeguards on national security and exclusions on foreign 
ownership and investment in key US industries.    
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The US – UAE FTA Negotiations 
 
Negotiations on a UAE FTA commenced in March 2005 - around the same time 
as the Oman negotiations.  However, significant differences were soon emerging 
between the two sides, with the UAE indicating that US insistence on a range of 
labour, intellectual property and human rights issues, at so early a stage in the 
negotiations, warranted a call for caution.  A former UAE Cabinet Minister 
suggested that the UAE would not benefit from an FTA with the United States 
and that the UAE should resist US pressure to amend its domestic legislation as 
part of the conditions of signing the agreement (Arab News, 2004b).  The former 
Minister criticised the United States for demanding changes to UAE law in a 
number of areas including investment and sponsorship laws.  By early 2006, the 
negotiations had stalled. While neither side would admit as much, a significant 
factor in the stalled UAE negotiations was the furore over the acquisition by a 
UAE company, Dubai Ports World, of the British Company, P&O Ports, which 
brought with it infrastructure ownership of six US ports.  The acquisition, which 
was consistent with Dubai Ports World’s global development and acquisition 
activity, generated an intense degree of hysteria in some sectors of US 
government and business that the UAE’s ownership of these US ports would 
constitute a grave risk to US security.  
 
After almost three years and five major rounds of talks later, both sides have still 
been unable to reach agreement on an FTA.  Prior to the latest round, the UAE 
declared in the local Arab press that it would resist pressure by the United States 
to immediately open its telecommunications sector to foreign investors.  The UAE 
Minister for Public Sector Development, Sultan bin Said Al Mansuri, has been 
quoted in the Arab language daily, Al Hayat, as stating that  “the entry of foreign 
companies to the sector is one of the main stumbling points in the negotiations” 
(Gulf News, 2006b).  In remarks published in the Dubai-based Arab language 
paper Emarat Al Yom, the Minister has said in respect of the US 
telecommunications demand that “This is rejected, we will not give up one of our 
rights. We must give the current operators the chance to develop before we allow 
new ones in” (Gulf News, 2006b). The UAE FTA negotiations continue to be 
marred by other contentious issues, including US demands for UAE labour 
market reforms, the opening of the services sector, and provision for 100% 
foreign ownership across the whole of the UAE business sector. At present, no 
date has been set for the next round of talks, and the United States and the UAE 
have since announced that they are unable to complete FTA negotiations under 
the existing timeframe for the TPA.  Nevertheless, in a display of diplomatic 
cordiality, the United States has announced that both sides agree that they 
remain committed to completing FTA negotiations at some later date (Gulf News, 
2007).   
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The US – Qatar FTA Negotiations 
 
In similar vein to the UAE refusal to concede to unacceptable US demands, 
Qatar has also taken a firm stance in respect of its negotiations. In April 2006, 
Qatari local press reported that Qatar had frozen FTA talks with the United States 
because Washington was imposing preconditions that were not in the Qatar’s 
interests.  The Qatari Ambassador to the United States, Nasser bin Hamad al 
Khalifa, has been quoted in the daily Al Sharq newspaper (Associated Press, 
2006) as saying that:  
 
“the talks were not proceeding in the right direction.  They were going 
nowhere.  It was like two deaf people talking to each other.  There was no 
sense continuing with the dialogue … Sometimes powerful countries put 
preconditions that are not in the best interests of smaller countries.”   
 
Questioning the need for an FTA in the first place, the Qatari Ambassador has 
suggested that the WTO agreements are sufficient for mutual trade and 
investment between any two member countries.  Qatar was already a major 
destination of investment for US companies because of the country’s very 
favourable investment laws and liberal trade regime.  The Ambassador has also 
suggested that Qatar “does not need a free trade agreement with the US”  
(Associated Press, 2006). In particular, the Qatari negotiators have raise 
objection to US demands for full access for US investors to Qatar’s services and 
energy industries and 100% foreign ownership of Qatari companies.  The Qatari 
government’s current stance is that, as one of the strongest global economies, it 
does not need either US financial support or preferential treatment for entry into 
US markets to enable its economy to continue to grow.  It can therefore take a 
strong bargaining position in respect of US demands, to the extent  of walking 
away from the negotiating table if it is not satisfied – a situation which the United 
States may well feel unused to in recent times.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The push by the United States to establish a system of regional trade blocs as 
part of a policy of global political controlled networks – which is its objective with 
the MEFTA – will not be without its eventual costs.  There are few illusions in the 
minds of the senior members of the Middle East states that the United States, 
despite its rhetoric to the contrary, will continue to place its own interests to the 
fore, irrespective of whether those interests are contrary to international norms or 
in total disregard of the best interests of all protagonist states. The perceived 
“messianic fervour” with which the United States pursues its democracy US-style 
agenda while ignoring the local character of the societies it is aiming to reform is 
seen as particularly problematic (Gulf Research Centre, 2005).  In particular, the 
United States has been accused of not listening to the needs of the countries in 
the region or understanding the realities of the situation on the ground.      
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Statements by US policy makers continue to reinforce a message of imposed 
change without consultation or consideration of local cultural values.  When those 
statements include remarks critical of the states’ efforts at modernisation and 
reform or are derogatory to the region’s rulers, particularly when made while a 
guest in an Arab country, they are also unlikely to be forgotten or quickly 
forgiven.  The following remarks made by then USTR Robert Zoellick, when 
launching the US’ MEFTA strategy, is unlikely to have endeared the US 
Administration to Middle East state leaders (Zoellick, 2003):   
 
“The U.S.-Middle East trade initiative complements and extends America’s 
already significant economic engagement with this region. Yet our efforts 
have been limited by old hatreds, political instability, corruption, bureaucracies 
and the privileged few who resist the competition of economic reforms, a 
search for enemies to blame instead of partners to build with, and price 
uncertainties for oil-dependent economies.”  
                
At an Arab Business Council Conference on the Bahrain FTA, participants 
reacted negatively to what they saw as the “Big Brother” attitude of the United 
States in respect of its bilateral trade agreements, perceiving the agreements to 
be political devices to serve US regional interests rather than tools to enhance 
the region’s economic prosperity (Arab New, 2005).  The claim by one US 
speaker that “if Arab countries can integrate with the US through FTAs, it will be 
easier for them to integrate with each other”, was both resented and ridiculed by 
subsequent speakers.  The Jordanian Minister of Industry and Trade responded 
that he “fail[s] to see the logic that if you want to achieve Arab integration, you 
have to go to the United States” (Arab News, 2005).   
   
The furore over the Dubai Ports World controversy and the consequent difficult 
passage through Congress of the Oman FTA, has further clearly demonstrated to 
Middle East states that the United States seeks to impose what those states view 
as double standards when it suits US interests.  While the United States 
demands a veto over foreign investment in its domestic enterprises, it continues 
to demand full access, including 100% foreign ownership in their negotiating 
protagonists.  The collapse of the Dubai Ports World US ports deal has been 
described in the local UAE press as a shattering episode that has damaged the 
US-UAE relationship. “The 9/11 paranoia, relentless Arab and UAE bashing, in 
addition to a weak president and a hysterical Congress have all pulled together to 
abort a sound business transaction by the DP World that would have been a key 
element in building a stronger US-UAE relationship” (Gulf News, 2006a). 
However, the hardening line by the UAE and Qatar in their respective stalled FTA 
negotiations should be a signal to the United States that there has been a 
diametric shift in the balance of negotiating power, dynamics and willingness to 
concur. 
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Failure by Congress to renew the fast-track approval process provided by the 
TPA has already led to a Congressional detailed dissection of prospective trade 
agreements with a consequential demand from both sides of politics for changes 
that are driven by a myriad of domestic political and economic imperatives from 
local interest groups.  It increases the likelihood that any bilateral trade deals the 
President sends to Congress during the remainder of his term, will be defeated 
(Financial Times (UK), 2007) or at least delayed beyond the end of his term.  It 
has also further dented the President’s already damaged credibility in the Middle 
East, and be a major blow to the ongoing promotion of the MEFTA strategy in its 
current guise.  
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